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"Based on my research, I have come to the conclusion that paperless electronic voting systems (also called "direct recording electronic" or "DRE" systems) are fundamentally insecure and do not provide sufficient protections against the sorts of fraudulent behavior that have been historically taken to manipulate the outcomes of elections in the U.S."

Dr. Dan S. Wallach, NIST/EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee, September 20, 2004.

Resources

Georgia Contract with Diebold

Contract

Appendix c

Appendix e

Appendix i

Appendix j

Appendix l

Appendix m

Appendix n

First Amendment

Second Amendment

Third Amendment

Fifth Amendment

Gems Configuration

2004 Election Records

Tattnall County DRE Absentee Recap Form, i.e. early voting (1.65 mb pdf)

Volusia-pct107-polltape (5.26 mb pdf)

Rehoboth-accum (2.81 mb pdf)

Research/Reports

• Transcript from "The Trouble with Touch Screens", HDNet, Dan Rather Reports: pdf format; html format, August 14, 2007.
  Other documents from the show.
  View the show online.

• Reports on Pilot Projects to Audit the Paper Trail from the TSX, November 2006 General Elections in Georgia (selected)

• Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007: STS REcommendations for the TGDC, November 2006 [pdf]

• Election Data Services Study of voting equipment used by county election jurisdictions in US in 2006 [pdf]

• "The Machinery of Democracy:  Protecting Elections in an Electronic World," Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair; Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, June 2006, full report (pdf)

• CalTech/MIT Report 2005 (pdf)

• General Accounting Office Report, 9/05 [pdf]

• Johns Hopkins/Rice Report

• Maryland SAIC Report [pdf]

• RABA Technologies Report [pdf]

• Ohio Compuware Technical Security Assessment Report

• IEEE Voting Equipment Standards - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Project 1583

Federal Elections Commission Standards (1990) & Voting System Standards (2002); 2005 Guidelines by date, HAVA 2002

Elections Assistance Commission (EAC)
Testimony (2004-05)

• "Threats to Voting System Transparency," submitted to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Gaithersburg, Maryland, September 20, 2004, Douglas W. Jones, associate professor, The University of Iowa Department of Computer Science
• Testimony [pdf] of Dr. Dan S. Wallach, NIST/EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee, September 20, 2004
• Statement for U.S. Election Assistance Commission News Conference, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
• Testimony, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, New York, NY, June 30, 2005, Dr. Aviel D. Rubin, Professor of Computer Science amd Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, Johns Hopkins University

Publications

• "Myth Breakers: Facts about Electronic Elections," 2nd Edition (download free from VotersUnite.org)

"Furthermore, it is emerging that the version of Windows CE used by Diebold is both heavily customized and full of dynamically loaded libraries. As a result, there are strong grounds for the conclusion that the operating system is not unmodified commercial off the shelf software (COTS), and that with this extensive use of dynamic linkage, we cannot even tell if the system being run on a particular voting machine resembles the system that was disclosed in the configuration documents submitted with this system when it went through the FEC/NASED approval process."

"The Case of the Diebold FTP Site," Douglas W. Jones, University of Iowa