JUNE 5, 2006
GAVV supports the passage of HR811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 in the 110th Congress. The bill may come up for a vote as soon as next week. We ask you to please contact your legislators and urge passage now. Find Georgia's Congressional contact information here
We support the bill for the following reasons and urge you to do the same.
HR811 bans paperless DREs. It introduces the concept that a paper audit trail is necessary. The realization that DREs are a failed technology will dawn on more and more people (including legislators and PFAW) over time as we continue to educate them -- and hopefully sooner rather than later!!
It introduces the concept that audits are important. Audit provisions can be strengthened over time.
It introduces the concept that there are certain times when it is appropriate to examine election-related software and disclose the results of that examination. Better disclosures can be achieved over time.
It requires that all voters be offered the option of voting on a paper ballot. This is a major shift and cannot be underestimated as to its importance.
It clearly states that uncertified voting equipment may not be used in any election.
It provides many protections and guarantees of equality for disabled voters.
It will prevent the introduction of Internet-based voting in any state or by the military. This is also an important preventive measure that should not be underestimated. For example, the Florida Democratic Party is currently exploring internet primaries. This would stop them from pushing for that option, and save us from having to fight against it and other such misguided efforts up the road.
It introduces the concept that wireless technology is not appropriate for elections. These provisions can be strengthened over time.
It addresses secure chain-of-custody and emphasizes the importance of that security. Many Florida counties have non-existent or very poor chain-of-custody, and just the recognition of its importance would be very helpful.
It allows any person aggrieved by a violation of HAVA Sections 301, 302 or 303 to file a complaint with the Attorney General. This is such an important provision.
It allows for the observation of ITA testing (although limited to observation by one person). The observation of testing can be expanded over time.
It requires the ITA to disclose all test protocolsl, results and communications between the ITA and the vendor to the EAC.
It puts a small dent in the opportunity for kickbacks and bribes by preventing direct payment to the ITAs by the manufacturers
It requires the EAC to notify the public as to which ITA conducted testing on which system, immediately at the conclusion of testing.
It requires the EAC to immediately notify Congress, the chief election official in a state, and the public if an ITA is de-certified, re-certified or has evidence of a significant security failure at any ITA.
It funds grants to develop better voting systems.
GAVV is calling on legislators to introduce legislation in the 2008 session that will meet proposed National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendations and future EAC 2007 Voluntary Voting System Standards:
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) December 4 & 5, 2006
Recommendations: To provide auditability and proactively address the increasing difficulty of protecting against all prospective threats, the TGDC directs STS to write requirements for the next version of the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) requiring the next generation of voting systems to be software independent. The TGDC directs STS and HFP to draft usability and accessibility requirement to ensure that all voters can verify the independent voting record. The TGDC further directs STS and CRT to draft requirements to ensure that systems that produce the independently verifiable voting records are reliable and provide adequate support for audits.
In the 2007 session, Representative Bearden filed a bill, LC 28 3156, that calls for adding printers to Georgia's voting system. This is a retread of an older bill that doesn't reflect changes in current technological knowledge of voting system vulnerabilities and requirements, or take into account current proposals by the federal government for future voting system standards. Since GA can not retrofit the current Diebold TSR6's voting system with printing technology, Bearden's legislation would mean purchasing a whole new voting system, the Diebold TSX, that may not meet NIST or future EAC 2007 VVS, and at a cost to the state and taxpayers of millions of dollars.
The Diebold TSX with the ballot reel printer was tested in 3 precincts in 3 counties in the 2006 election, as required by SB500, introduced by Senator Bill Stephens (R) in the 2006 legislative session. This printing technology has been used in elections in Ohio, North Carolina, California and other states, and proven itself to be a poor choice in terms of providing reliable and verifiable voter verified paper ballots.Reports on the audits of these tests are posted here. Auditing those ballots is difficult and constitutes an undue burder on poll workers and election supervisors as shown in reports from those counties.
Voters also lose the anonymity of their vote, because the votes are recorded on the paper records in the order in which they were cast.
Cathy Cox estimated on September 22, 2006, that buying a new TSX voting system, so the state would have verified voting using Diebold's DREs, would cost the state $66 million. That's in addition to the over $100 million that the state has already invested in the current voting system including purchase costs, maintenance, storage, security, upgrades, and technical assistance. DRE voting is not only insecure, but upkeep on these systems bleeds millions in taxpayer funds.
Dr. Justin Moore, Department of Computer Science, D307 Levine Science Research Center, Duke University prepared a Per-County Cost Comparison spreadsheet on the costs of purchasing optical scan voting system vs. buying new DREs in Georgia. Over a five-year period, the state could potentially save over $25,000,000 or more by replacing the current DRES with an optical scan voting system.
Precinct based optical scan voting systems with random manual audits (hand counts) of the paper at percentages that will produce a 99% confidence level in the results will give Georgia a voting system that will conform to the proposed 2007 EAC VSS and NIST guidelines for software independent voter verification and ensure that the votes in Georgia were counted accurately and securely. Legislation must include provisions for scientifically verified methods for conducting independent audits and voters must be allowed to monitor the conduct of elections at every step in the process -- no more "behind the curtain" vendor control or having to trust that election officials will do the right thing.
For HAVA mandated independent voting by those with disabilities, there are a number of technologies now available that the state can choose from: Vote Pad, would meet future EAC and NIST guidelines for software independent (SI) voting systems; but if the state insists on keeping Diebold as a vendor, Automark is now being ceritified by the EAC for use with Diebold optical scan systems, although it is not SI and therefore might not meet proposed future EAC/NIST guidelines.
VVPB Legislation 2006
In 2006, GAVV supported the Vote Count Protection Act (VCPA), SB591, introduced by Vincent Fort, 39th district, and has bipartisan sponsorship:
(1) Fort, Vincent 39th
(2) Shafer, David 48th
(3) Meyer von Bremen, Michael 12th
(4) Tate, Horacena 38th
(5) Henson, Steve 41st
Electronic voting machines can be accidentally or intentionally programmed in a variety of ways to record and count the vote differently from what the voter intends. Additional problems arise in paperless implementations, because there is no mechanism to conduct a recount independently of the election tally that is computed by the system’s software.
“These major flaws will be rectified with the passage of this legislation. In providing for voter-verified paper ballots (vvpb) that will be counted at the precinct level, voters gain an auditing mechanism to compare to the electronic tally,” said Anne Merkl, chair of the Voter Choice Coalition who authored the original Vote Count Protection Act. “We believe very strongly that securing the integrity of our elections should be at the top of the 2006 legislative agenda.”
The VCPA provides for a vvpb, which is the ballot of record, source code for voting systems open to the public for inspection, and hand counts of the paper ballots on election night at the precincts. These provisions will give the state a true independent audit of the machine totals. Without a transparent or security process, for the vote to be legitimate in Georgia, it is essential to have an independent mechanism for auditing the vote, which this legislation's combination of vvpb and hand counts achieves.
Sponsored by Rep. Geisinger of the 48th District, HB790 calls for a voter verified paper record to be used as the official ballot of record in cases of discrepancies, for recounts or contested elections only, which would require petitioning the SOS. Section 3 has a language calling for "reexamination or reapproval of such system" in the case of improvements or changes" but does not specify what authority would be conducting such an examination. In Ga. election code there is already such a provision.
An audit mechanism is provided, which calls for a random sample of the paper records to be hand counted at each precinct; a stronger provision than earlier versions of this bill, which called for one precinct per county. However, there is no triggering mechanism to widen the count for this race to other precincts or counties if there is a discrepancy -- until after the election. Rather, the superintendent posts a notice at his/her office and on the official (county?) website. The bill does provide for this discrepancy to be a new basis for contesting an election, but the count is to be triggered for the race in question in the county of the precinct where the discrepancy was discovered, not for the entire state. A wider count could only be petitioned for if the precinct results put the results of the entire race in question.
Senate Bill 500 was introduced this legislative session by Senator Bill Stephens, Georgia 27th district and Republican candidate for Secretary of State in 2006, working in collaboration with Democratic SOS Cathy Cox (Macon.com).
When the bill was first introduced, it included a provision for a voter-verified, permanent paper record of votes (not to be the ballot of record) to be implemented for Georgia's Diebold DRE voting system in 2007 and for a "pilot program/electronic voting" to be implemented for 2006.
The substitute bill passed by the Senate State and Local Governmental Operations (SLOGO) committee on March 6, 2006, was stripped of the paper requirement.
SB500 offers no meaningful legislation to offset the security flaws in the system and will do nothing to increase voter confidence in the validity of the state's elections. The substitute bill calls for pilot testing of a vvpt technology in one precinct of each of three counties -- Cobb, Bibb and Camden -- for the 2006 federal election, while the remainder of the state's votes are still to be cast on paperless DREs.
SB500 was passed and signed by the governor. This means that "audited" votes for the 2006 election will be somewhere between a low of 1,021 and a high of 5,772, depending on turnout in the 3 precincts. To put this in perspective, it represents approximately .0017% of the votes in the state in the 2004 general election.
Georgia paid Diebold $50,000 for the technology to conduct this test -- Diebold voting stations with a paper roll attached. This printing technology is a large, continuous roll of paper that is difficult to use in a recount, and has been demonstrated to be so poorly designed that even advocates of vvpb reject it.
Twenty-seven states now have regulations requiring paper ballots. As other states are leading the way, Georgia lags shamefully behind in adopting transparent, secure and auditable elections.
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