TIME TO TAKE ACTION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
JUNE 5, 2006
GAVV supports the passage of HR811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 in the 110th Congress. The bill may come up for a vote as soon as next week. Please contact your legislators now and urge passage. If this bill doesn't pass there could be 35 million or more voters in the US voting on paperless DREs in 2008 and beyond.
Georgians should contact the following legislators:
Jack Kingston R, 1st
Sanford D. Bishop Jr., 2nd D Yes
Lynn A. Westmoreland, R 3rd
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson Jr. D 4th Yes
John Lewis D 5th Yes
Tom Price R 6th
John Linder R 7th
Jim Marshall D 8th Yes
Nathan Deal R 9th
Charlie Norwood 10th
Phil Gingrey R 11th
John Barrow 12th D Yes
David Scott 13th D Yes
If they are currently cosponsors (Yes, above), thank them and tell them you appreciate their support and want to urge them to stand behind the 2008 implementation deadline. If they aren't cosponsors, ask them to vote "YES" on the bill.
Find other Congressional contact information here.
Why we support passage of HR811 and keeping the 2008 implementation date. We urge others to join us in pushing for its passage:
HR811 bans paperless DREs. It introduces the concept that a paper audit trail is necessary. The realization that DREs are a failed technology will dawn on more and more people (including legislators and PFAW) over time as we continue to educate them -- and hopefully sooner rather than later!!
It introduces the concept that audits are important. Audit provisions can be strengthened over time.
It introduces the concept that there are certain times when it is appropriate to examine election-related software and disclose the results of that examination. Better disclosures can be achieved over time.
It requires that all voters be offered the option of voting on a paper ballot. This is a major shift and cannot be underestimated as to its importance.
It clearly states that uncertified voting equipment may not be used in any election.
It provides many protections and guarantees of equality for disabled voters.
It will prevent the introduction of Internet-based voting in any state or by the military. This is also an important preventive measure that should not be underestimated. For example, the Florida Democratic Party is currently exploring internet primaries. This would stop them from pushing for that option, and save us from having to fight against it and other such misguided efforts up the road.
It introduces the concept that wireless technology is not appropriate for elections. These provisions can be strengthened over time.
It addresses secure chain-of-custody and emphasizes the importance of that security. Many Florida counties have non-existent or very poor chain-of-custody, and just the recognition of its importance would be very helpful.
It allows any person aggrieved by a violation of HAVA Sections 301, 302 or 303 to file a complaint with the Attorney General. This is such an important provision.
It allows for the observation of ITA testing (although limited to observation by one person). The observation of testing can be expanded over time.
It requires the ITA to disclose all test protocolsl, results and communications between the ITA and the vendor to the EAC.
It puts a small dent in the opportunity for kickbacks and bribes by preventing direct payment to the ITAs by the manufacturers
It requires the EAC to notify the public as to which ITA conducted testing on which system, immediately at the conclusion of testing.
It requires the EAC to immediately notify Congress, the chief election official in a state, and the public if an ITA is de-certified, re-certified or has evidence of a significant security failure at any ITA.
It funds grants to develop better voting systems.
Find a link to the bill on the GAVV legislation page.
ACTION IN GEORGIA
Our vote is our power. Our vote is our democracy. Don't give your consent to a voting system, Georgia's Diebold Election System (DES), that is not transparent, secure, or verifiable. Because it is not verifiable, we can not know if the results are accurate. Lacking these four elements we don't have a democratic election process.
You can take back that power. Go to your phones, faxes, and email or write a letter and send it to the members of the Georgia Board of Elections and the Secretary of State.
Let them know that you want Georgia's Diebold Election System to be replaced by a precinct-based optical scan system with random manual audits.
Tell everyone you know to do the same. We have the power to do this, now let's make it happen.
Sample Letter:
To: The Georgia State Election Board and Secretary of State
I am calling today on the Georgia State Election Board and the Secretary of State to replace the state’s Diebold Election System (DES) with an optical scan system that includes random hand-count audits before the 2008 General Election.
Optical scan systems are more cost effective (see: "Per-County Cost Comparison" spreadsheet for Georgia – http://www.cs.duke.edu/~justin/voting/ga-costs/ – which estimates costs of purchasing optical scan voting system vs. buying new DREs in Georgia. Over a five-year period, the state could potentially save over $25,000,000 or more by replacing the current DRES with an optical scan voting system.)
Optical scan systems are less expensive to purchase and maintain, provide a software independent source for audits and recounts (the paper ballot marked by the voter), have a durable paper ballot, need fewer machines to store and set up, and have lower undervote rates (when precint optical scans are used). Voters don't have to wait in line or have shorter waits, and these systems are easier for election officials and poll workers to program, set up and use to conduct elections.
Security vulnerabilities exposed in the architecture of the DES are being called "major national security risks" by computer science and security experts around the nation, including the September 2006
Princeton Study: "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," the July 2006 Hursti reports, and the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security. The effect of these vulnerabilities are that the security of our votes on the DES could be compromised throughout the entire state, enabling an attacker to alter election results on a massive scale without detection. Once the vulnerabilities are exploited, the voting system could be under the control of the attacker, not only for the current election, but also for future elections.
The computer scientists who are knowledgeable of the technical details of these vulnerabilities state that the problems represent open backdoors in the design of the Diebold TS-R6 and TSX voting systems.
It is clear that the current mechanisms for detecting security vulnerabilities, including state and national certification and testing, are not sufficient to protect the state from election fraud. The state’s Kennesaw Center for Elections did not catch the security vulnerabilities mentioned in the above reports; neither did the national Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs); nor the state's “Logic and Accuracy” testing; nor the “hashing;” nor the escrowed code; nor the software version control system; nor any other mechanisms on down the list that voters have been told would ensure that Georgia’s voting system would be secure.
Voting on DREs also represents a threat to the democratic process because these systems are not only insecure but are not transparent processes. Voting in a democracy is not about trusting that behind the curtain, individuals will do the right thing. It’s about systems of checks and balances, security, transparency, and verifiability. The state’s current voting system fails on all counts.
We trust you will take the right action and immediately call for the the replacement of the DES in Georgia with an optical scan voting system that includes random hand-counted audits.
Sincerely yours,
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