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NOTABLE QUOTES :
"This document describes several security issues with the Diebold electronic voting terminals TSx and TS6 ....One of them...seems to enable a malicious person to compromise the equipment even years before actually using the exploit, possibly leaving the voting terminal incurably compromised." Page 2, unredacted Hursti II report, July 4, 2006.
"All three voting systems [ES&S, Diebold, Sequoia] have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities, which pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state and local elections."
"With electronic voting systems, there are certain attacks that can reach enough voting machines . . ..that you could affect the outcome of the statewide election," said Lawrence D. Norden, associate counsel of the Brennan Center," from "A Single Person Could Swing An Election," Zachary A. Goldfarb, Washington Post, June 28, 2006.
"Most of the electronic voting machines widely adopted since the disputed 2000 presidential election "pose a real danger to the integrity of national, state and local elections," a report out Tuesday concludes." Andrea Stone, USA Today
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GAVV NEWS |
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August 15, 2007
Watch Dan Rather Reports, "The Trouble with Touch Screens"
"Dan Rather Reports presents conclusive evidence of the failure of touch screen voting machines across the country. The episode, "The Trouble with Touch Screens", is an entire hour devoted to new information on this story. From scientists involved in testing the equipment, to manufacturers in third world countries who shipped these defective voting machines to the United States, Dan Rather Reports presents new information showing that these defective machines may have altered the outcome of multiple elections."
HDNet, http://www.hd.net/drr227.html
To sign a petition for a full Congressional investigation, go to:
August 3, 2007
Conditional approval for use of DREs as option for disabled, but with voter verified paper ballots that will be 100% hand counted.
July 20, 2007
This report was prepared by the University of California, Berkeley under contract
to the California Secretary of State as part of a “Top-to-Bottom” review of
electronic voting systems certified for use in the State of California, July 20, 2007
".... Moreover, because the upgrade process is under software control, there is
no easy way to reset a machine and restore it to a safe state once its software has been corrupted. An AV-TSX or GEMS server, once infected, is very difficult to disinfect with confidence." p. 22
"We are not optimistic that stricter chain-of-custody controls will prove effective in addressing the vulnerabilities identified in this report. We were not able to identify any realistic procedures that would ensure that voting equipment and memory cards remain under two-person control at all times. Leaving voting machines unattended overnight in a polling place breaks the chain of custody and creates an opportunity for an attacker to tamper with the machines. Sending voting equipment home with the chief poll worker allows that person unsupervised access to the equipment; since in many counties essentially any registered voter who volunteers can become a poll worker, it is difficult to prevent an attacker from becoming a poll worker. Since it might take only one compromised machine to spread a virus to all the county’s voting machines, the prospects for devising chain-of-custody rules that will meet the necessary level of perfection in practice seem dim." p. 58
"The clear implication of this fact is that if election officials have unsupervised access to the election management systems, the integrity of those systems is provided mainly by procedural controls and the honesty of officials, not by any technical measures." p. 73
"Given the costs of designing a new voting system, leaving the Diebold software largely unmodified and relying on procedural changes to mitigate the threats that we describe may seem attractive to policymakers. We consider this to be a risky approach, however, because we are not convinced that it is possible to fully resolve the security problems in the Diebold system through procedural means. We are concerned that, because the Diebold system is vulnerable in so many ways, the procedures needed to protect it would be extensive, complex, and hard to follow. We worry that despite the best efforts and intentions of election officials, the procedures would not be followed perfectly every time and the system would sometimes be left open to attack. As a result, we believe that rather than attempting to retrofit security onto a flawed system, it is safer to reengineer the Diebold system so that it is secure by design.
Building a secure voting system requires making security a central part of the design process from the start. It also demands the involvement of election administrators, experienced software architects and developers, and experts in software security and physical security. Such a system would need to use design techniques appropriate for security-critical systems, such as threat modeling, attack surface reduction, defense in depth, and privilege separation. It would need to apply sound, generally accepted engineering practices for secure software, including input validation, defensive programming, and security testing and assessment. Designing a secure voting system is an expensive proposition that requires a long-term commitment, but the ultimate benefit of doing so is increased confidence in the electoral process." p. 64
Time Has Come for Congress to Help Fix Voting System
By Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State of Minnesota
June 11, 2007
With assistance from the Help America Vote Act, most states have now retired the punch-cards systems and lever voting machines that plagued elections in the past, most famously in Florida. This was an important first step down the path of restoring public trust in our elections. Now it is time for the next step.
Ironically, Florida is leading the way. Gov. Charlie Crist's (R) recent decision to replace expensive and unreliable direct electronic voting machines with paper ballots counted by inexpensive optical scanners is the next big leap toward security and integrity in elections. Recently, the state of Maryland and counties in other states have joined Florida in making this shift. In Mississippi, Harrison County Clerk Gayle Parker explained that her county board voted unanimously to dump their electronic voting machines because "we've had a lot of problems with the machines" and "if we have a contested election, we're not going to have a paper ballot to be able to rely on."
Florida has adopted the voting system that we use in Minnesota, where every citizen votes by marking a paper ballot that is then counted by an optical scanner located in each polling place. These counting machines are then double-checked with post-election random audits. Crist had one overriding objective in his decision - "no more election embarrassments" - and he will be implementing these changes before the 2008 presidential election. About two dozen other states are moving in the same direction or are already there. The confidence of Minnesota voters in our paper ballot-based system is one reason why we consistently lead the nation in voter turnout. This approach also turns out to be the lowest cost and simplest to administer - important considerations for government.
Congress needs to help other states move in the same direction as Florida. The federal government must provide the funds needed to replace unverifiable direct recording electronic voting machines.
Several bills moving through the House and Senate would provide the money needed to help other states take the same steps as Florida. In the House, the bill with the most support and momentum is H.R. 811, and it is slated to go to the floor in the next few weeks. Introduced by Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) with more than 200 bipartisan co-sponsors, this bill provides the financial support many states will need to move toward a verifiable system with paper ballots.
H.R. 811 rightly requires that all paperless voting systems be upgraded to produce an auditable paper record before the November 2008 presidential election (the bill permits later, staggered deadlines for other improvements). Considering the mounting evidence that paperless computerized voting machines can fail or be hacked, it is only prudent to require the production of paper record for all voting machines before our next federal election. This simple safeguard will immeasurably increase integrity, security and confidence of our democracy.
This bill deserves the support of every voter who has worried that our election system is broken. It deserves the support of election judges and poll workers frustrated by electronic voting equipment that constantly breaks down or loses votes. It deserves the support of local- and state-level elected officials who want free and fair elections but lack the money needed to fix their broken systems. And it deserves the support of every Member of Congress who has heard the anger and cynicism of citizens who no longer believe our elections can be trusted.
Congress is moving toward establishing national standards for transparency and verifiability in federal elections, seeking to demonstrate to voters everywhere that the many different systems used at the local level in our country are equally accurate and secure. H.R. 811 is an important first step in this direction.
Paper ballots, optical scanners, effective testing and post-election audits are not the end of the journey to securing our democracy - they are just the next step. And 2008 is not the end of our search for a democracy restored, it's just the next step. I agree with Florida Gov. Crist - no more embarrassments. Our democracy cannot afford the price of another failed election.
Article re-posted from VoteTrustUSA
Attorney General to Probe 2006 Election Certification Practices
The Georgia State Election Board on March 13, 2007 voted unanimously (with one abstention) to refer a complaint filed on December 13, 2006 by Georgians for Verified Voting (GAVV) to the state Attorney General for investigation.
The complaint raises questions about the electronic voting system used in the 2006 primary and general elections: whether key rules and procedures related to system certification were followed by the former Secretary of State Cathy Cox, Election Director Kathy Rogers, Britain Williams, consultant to the state's voting system certifying agent, Kennesaw Center for Elections, and Diebold Election Systems.
Bob Barr, former member of the U.S. Congress (1995-2003) and president of Liberty Strategies, presented the complaint to the Board.
In his statement Barr said: "When there are credible questions raised about touch-screen electronic voting, the state must confirm the source, identify the problem, and put into action a plan to correct the problem or to credibly assure the public that the perceived problems were not in fact extant. The state of Georgia has a profound interest in taking all reasonable steps to investigate such concerns...."
"We have every confidence that the Attorney General will conduct a thorough and complete investigation into this matter," said Donna Price, director of GAVV, "and we applaud the State Election Board for their decision.
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EAC Hearing: Frank Padilla, Wyle Labs, (left), when asked by EAC commissioner, "Is my vote going to count?" Testing Labs who test the machines hired and paid by the manufacturers of DREs. |
TAKE ACTION: Call for replacement of Georgia's Diebold Election System with precinct-based optical scan system with ballot markers for the disabled and random hand count audits. GAVV is calling on legislators to pass legislation that meets proposed National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines and future EAC 2007 Voluntary Voting System Standards. Over a five-year period, the state could potentially save over $25,000,000 or more by replacing the current DRES with an optical scan voting system. Story >
Princeton: DREs vulnerable to hacking
"Our demonstration vote-stealing applications can easily be generalized
to steal votes on behalf of a particular party rather than a fixed
candidate, to steal votes only in certain elections or only at certain
dates or times, to steal votes only or preferentially from certain
parties or candidates, to steal a fixed fraction of votes rather than
trying to ensure a fixed percentage result, to randomize the percentage
of votes stolen, and so on . . . . Any desired algorithm can be used to
determine which votes to steal and to which candidate or candidates to
transfer the stolen votes." http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/
"Voting in a democracy is not about trusting that behind the curtain individuals will do the right thing. It's about security, transparency and auditability. It's about checks and balances. And Georgia's voting system fails on all counts." Donna Price, director, GAVV,
CNN transcript:
Lou Dobbs Tonight, 6/20/06 (transcript)
"Well, let's be clear. It is absolutely demonstrable that with the use of electronic voting machines in which we do not have verifiable receipts and a way of independently auditing those votes -- democracy is at risk anyway as we approach the midterm elections...." Lou Dobbs,
CNN transcript: Lou Dobbs Tonight, 6/7/06
"Does the American government think Americans are the biggest fools in the world?...Otherwise how does it expect to get away with a system where private so-called 'independent testing labs,' acting as the clients of the voting machine vendors, conduct all testing of the machines, are bought and paid for by the vendors and report back in secret only to the 'clients'!" Lou Dobbs, "Democracy at Risk," CNN, 10/26/06. http://blip.tv/file/92707/
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In the Press |
August 7, 2007
August 02, 2007
Sumner Lemon, IDG News Service, PCWorld
June 13, 2007
May 3, 2007
May 2, 2007
WASHINGTON --
U.S. election officials gave Florida the go-ahead Tuesday to use federal money to pay for voting machines with a paper trail, easing the way for the state Legislature to scrap touch-screen machines in Miami-Dade, Broward and 13 other counties.
U.S. House task force votes to investigate the District 13 vote, Lesley Clark, Bradenton Herald
May 1, 2007
Federal funds pave way to voting paper trail, Lesley Clark and Gary Fineout
April 19, 2007
April 18, 2007
April 12, 2007
March 20, 2007
March 17, 2007
March 17, 2007
March 15, 2007
Smooth Undervoting In Sarasota, FL, John Washburn
[How a defect in the technology of the ES&S touchscreen voting system used in FL in 2006 may explain the high undervotes in district 13 (FL CD-13) race.
March 13, 2007
Election Prison Sentencing, I-Team, Fox 8, Cleveland, Ohio
Two stiff prison sentences Tuesday bring on srong reactions from the defendants' families.
Related story: Election Workers Sentenced for Fraud . "Two former Cuyahoga County elections officials have each been sentenced to 18 months in prison for their roles in the county's now infamous 2004 Presidential recount."
March 4, 2007
February 17, 2007
January 11, 2007
Interview with Donna Price, GAVV director, by Wilson R. Smith on "What Is Goin' On?" 100.9.
January 4, 2007
Ciber is the "Independent Testing Authority" that has been testing Georgia's voting systems since 2002. Irregularities with Ciber in the certification process have been noted here in the past. Most recently in GAVV's complaint to the State Election Board was the question of the legality of Ciber adding the TSX to a supposedly already certified voting system for GA as documented in a letter from Kathy Rogers to Diebold.
January 4, 2007
"Missing votes in Ohio call races into question," Bob Fitrakis, Online Journal [Major problems with DREs with Real Time Audit Log paper rolls ]
January 3, 2007
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